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Supply Chain Vulnerability Assessment:  
A Network Based Visualization and Clustering Analysis Approach  
 
ABSTRACT 
Supply chains are large, complex, and often unpredictable. Purchasing and supply managers and 
supply chain risk managers need methods and tools to enable them to quickly understand how 
unexpected disruptions in the supply chain start and grow and to what extent will they negatively 
impact the flow of goods and services. This paper introduces a methodological approach that can 
be used by both researchers and managers to quickly visualize a supply chain, map out the 
propagation path of disruptive events from the supply side to the end customer and understand 
potential weaknesses in the supply chain design; taking into account the structure, connectivity, 
and dependence within the supply chain. The approach incorporates a Petri net and 
Triangularization Clustering Algorithm to offer insights into a supply chain network’s 
vulnerabilities and can be used to efficiently assess supply chain disruption mitigation strategies, 
especially in complex and difficulty to analyze supply chain systems. 
 
Keywords: Supply chain risk management, Supply chain vulnerability, Supply chain design, Petri 
net, Supply chain disruptions 
 
INTRODUCTION   
Globally competing firms have inherently large and complex supply chain systems that are 
particularly vulnerable to disruptive events (Blackhurst et al., 2005a; Craighead et al., 2007; Manuj 
and Mentzer, 2008; Giannakis and Louis, 2011). These complex supply chains have garnered 
much attention considering methods and means to understand their nature and their risk 
vulnerability (Tang, 2006; Sodhi et al., 2012). A disruption in the supply chain may lead to other 
entities failing and may even result in entire portions of the supply chain failing (Jüttner and 
Maklan, 2011). Supply chain vulnerability is the susceptibility or exposure to a disruptive event in 
the supply chain (Wagner and Bode, 2006; Bhamra et al., 2011; Ghadge et al., 2012; Wagner and 
Neshat, 2012).  Prior literature has discussed steps for managing disruptive events in the supply 
chains as first identifying the potential disruptions, next assessing the likelihood and potential 
impact and finally selecting and implementing a mitigation strategy (Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; 
Manuj and Mentzer, 2008).  The identification step can occur before the disruption occurs allowing 
managers to proactively avoid or reduce the impact of the disruption (Craighead et al., 2007; 
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Knemeyer et al., 2009). Conversely, the disruption may be unavoidable leading to more reactive 
planning (Craighead et al., 2007). When a supply chain is vulnerable to a disruption, the goal is to 
develop resilience in the supply chain, such that after a disruption has occurred the network can be 
leveraged to regain a desired service level as quickly as possible (Ambulkar et al., 2015; Pettit et 
al., 2013).  Managing vulnerabilities is difficult because supply chains are interconnected with 
high levels of supply and demand uncertainty. Because of the complexity and interconnected 
nature of supply chains and their effect on disruption propagation, it is essential to understand the 
structure of the supply chain and its vulnerability to disruptions (Wagner and Neshat, 2010; 
Mizgier et al., 2013). When purchasing and supply managers restrict their focus solely on first tier 
suppliers they may not perceive disruption events moving in their supply chain until it is too late 
(Tang et al., 2009). Therefore, a method for understanding supply chain vulnerability would be 
useful to purchasing and supply managers to reconfigure the network structure and relationships 
or reposition capacity and resources to reduce the risk or effects of disruptions. While there are 
many types of disruptions that occur in supply chain networks, we focus on the specific disruption 
of node failure. That is to say, when a node in the supply network is no longer able to produce, 
ship, or transship products or services, the supply network has experienced a disruption. 
 Researchers employ various techniques including optimization, simulation, and regression 
to understand and explain supply chain networks. Recently, analytics methods have gained 
traction, creating greater diversity in approaching a very complex set of problems and giving 
supply chain research a fuller perspective (Waller and Fawcett, 2013a). These methods find their 
roots in World War II with Dantzig’s simplex method but have expanded through ERP into 
business intelligence (Sahay and Ranjan, 2008), and most recently to supply chain analytics 
(Waller and Fawcett, 2013b; Souza, 2014). The challenge purchasing and supply managers face is 
 3 
to employ appropriate analytical methods to help decision making in the face of a supply chain 
disruption. 
Statistics, optimization and simulation are commonly used by researchers and managers to 
understand characteristics, behaviors, and nature of supply chains. Techniques like regression are 
used to describe theoretical models (e.g. Chong et al., 2015) or predictive analytics (Lindsey et al. 
2014). Optimization has been used to search a problem space for the best solution given a set of 
constraints, and simulation can model the behavior and dynamics of systems (Tomlin, 2006; 
Griffis et al., 2012). The choice of technique is often a function of the problem and the maturity of 
the organization (de Oliveira et al., 2012). 
In addition to these approaches, many researchers use heuristics and other techniques to 
gain analytical insights into supply chain problems (e.g. Memari et al., 2015). However, each of 
these methods is not without its limitations (Chapman et al., 2002; Zhang et al., 2011). When 
considering supply chain vulnerabilities, the need to understand a particular structure, model, or 
set of variables can prove problematic. Tang (2006) suggests reducing the impact of disruptions 
on supply chain operations by proactively forming strategic alliances with multiple suppliers in 
different countries. Ghadge et al. (2011) reach the same conclusion arguing for systems thinking. 
However, true systems thinking is a challenging task given that purchasing and supply managers 
have difficulty in monitoring suppliers more than two tiers from a focal firm. As a result, 
purchasing and supply managers are often caught unaware when a disruption that began several 
tiers upstream can cascade to the focal firm (Scheibe and Blackhurst, 2017). In fact, recent research 
has called for studies that adopt a more systems based lens and look at network based models to 
understand how disruptions impact supply chains (Van der Vegt et al., 2015).  A similar call to 
action had been issued by Nair and Vidal (2011) to investigate a way to understand which nodes 
 4 
in a network should be fortified for protection against supply chain against disruptions. Finally, 
Kirilmaz and Erol (2017) note that the use of quantitative methods in supply chain risk 
management is insufficient and call for more tools to address supply chain vulnerability.  
 In this paper, we answer these calls through the development an approach that helps 
visualize and understand supply chain structure and assess vulnerability in that structure to supply 
chain disruptions (Min and Zhou, 2002; Blackhurst et al., 2005a; Zsidisin et al., 2005; Skipper and 
Hanna, 2009). The contribution of this research is the combination of Petri nets with 
Triangularization Clustering Algorithm (TCA) to assess disruption vulnerability of a supply chain 
based on its the structure. This approach will map out the propagation path of disruption events, 
and uncover vulnerabilities stemming from the supply chain design: the structure, connectivity and 
dependence within the supply chain. Triangles are the basic unit for measuring network structure 
and redundancy (Cheng et al., 2009), and have been used to quantify structure and flow in networks. 
Network nodes are interconnected, and thus it is important to measure more than nearness as 
proximate distance may not convey the strength of relationship between nodes. Triangularized 
clustering approaches have been used to identify network redundancies (Schank and Wagner, 2004) 
and structural invariances across websites (Zhou et al., 2007). This approach, once applied, 
provides novel insights into how the structure of a supply chain can impede or enable a disruption 
to propagate. When a firm’s supply chain is hit with a disruption, it is not only important to know 
which node in the supply chain is directly hit, but it is also important to know all possible scenarios 
for disruption propagation. We combine the Petri net approach with a clustering algorithm, the 
Triangularization Clustering (TCA), which identifies clusters and other network characteristics in 
order to gain insights into the vulnerabilities of the system. By combining these two methods into 
a new methodological approach, we build upon prior research to develop an assessment of supply 
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chain vulnerability based on the structure of the supply chain and analyze how the structure of a 
supply chain can facilitate or hinder the propagation of a disruption. This insight is lacking in the 
literature and offers new knowledge to assess and manage disruptions in the supply chain. 
In the following sections we introduce and illustrate the utility of our proposed decision 
model by first considering an exemplar service parts supply chain for an automotive firm to 
illustrate the functionality of our approach. In section 2, we introduce a Petri net and clustering 
algorithm combination to identify structural and procedural vulnerabilities in the supply chain. We 
demonstrate the applicability of our approach with our automotive firm example. Next, we provide 
insights on vulnerability for the service parts supply chains, and finally, we provide interesting 
extensions to our methodological approach with respect to supply chain disruption mitigation. The 
model presented in this research is appealing to both industry and the academy because it provides 
a road map for purchasing and supply managers to evaluate their supply base and network both in 
terms of connectivity and contractual agreements and processes. 
 
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
The Petri net, developed originally by Carl Petri for modeling communication protocols, 
has evolved into a graphical and mathematical tool for representing and analyzing discrete event 
systems (Zurawski and Zhou, 1994), including manufacturing systems (e.g., Venkatesh et al., 1996; 
Yan et al., 1999; Yu et al., 2003) and supply chains (e.g., Blackhurst et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2005; 
Fridgen et al., 2015). As a graphical tool, the Petri net is a bipartite graph using nodes and arcs to 
visually map a system, while, as a mathematical tool, it can be embedded with mathematical 
functions for analysis of system properties.1 Petri nets are proven tools for modeling complex and 
                                                 
 
1 A more complete discussion of Petri nets can be found in Murata (1989) and Zurawski and 
Zhou (1994). 
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dynamic systems as well as for evaluating network structure (Tuncel and Alpan, 2010; Zhang et 
al., 2011). It is essential to understand that the logic (or mathematical functions) that can be 
embedded in a Petri net can cause the model to become non-linear. This is both a strength and 
weakness intrinsic to the Petri net. It is a weakness because it prevents the network from being 
solvable in an optimization fashion, and it is a strength because it allows a network to more 
accurately represent reality in terms of contractual agreements, processes and procedures. We will 
describe this in greater detail and illustrate an example with the automotive firm. 
To properly introduce fundamental concepts and terminologies related to the Petri net and 
how our methodological approach may be used to predict supply chain vulnerability, we present 
an example of how a supply chain can be represented by the Petri net. There are several open 
source Petri net tools available for research such as WoPeD (http://woped.dhbw-
karlsruhe.de/woped/). Figure 1 shows a six-tier Service Parts Supply Chain for a U.S. heavy 
equipment manufacturer. This Service Parts Supply Chain is a subsection of a more complete 
supply chain; its structure was identified through interviews conducted with various supply chain 
managers employed by the U.S. heavy equipment manufacturer. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
As shown, the Service Parts Supply Chain is comprised of three U.S.-based distribution 
centers (DC 1, 2, and 3) belonging to the same firm. DC 1 and DC 2 supply items to DC 3, who 
supplies items to the Manufacturing Facility. DC 1 and DC 2 also supply items to each other as 
needed. The Manufacturing Facility serves four dealer locations (Dealers 1, 2, 3, and 4). DC 1 to 
DC 3 source items from seven suppliers – Supplier 7 supplies DC 3, Supplier 1, and Supplier 2; 
Supplier 6 supplies DC 2, DC 3, Supplier 1, and Supplier 3; Supplier 5 supplies DC 2 and Supplier 
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1; Supplier 4 supplies DC 1 and Supplier 2; Supplier 3 supplies both DC 1 and DC 2; Supplier 2 
supplies Supplier 3 and Supplier 5; and finally, Supplier 1 supplies Supplier 4.  
Figure 2 redraws the same Service Parts Supply Chain depicted in Figure 1 as a Petri net 
with two types of nodes: place nodes and transition nodes (Murata 1989). Place nodes, depicted 
by circles and labeled mi’s, generally represent locations or conditions (e.g., a distribution facility 
location in a supply chain or whether or not items are ready to be shipped or to be inspected at a 
location). Place node m1, as such, denotes Supplier 1. Transition nodes in a Petri net are depicted 
by rectangles, are labeled aj’s, and generally denote events (e.g., shipment of product, product 
assembly, or inventory receipt). Murata (1989, pg. 542) describes a transition as an event which 
has an “input and output places representing the pre-conditions and post- conditions of the event, 
respectively.” Transition node a1, as such, denotes the shipping of items from Supplier 7. An 
advantage of a Petri net is the flexibility and granularity in defining what the place nodes and the 
transitions nodes can represent. Place nodes, besides denoting conditions, can also be defined to 
represent an entity within a Petri-Net represented system (e.g., a manufacturing plant or a 
warehouse) or a location within an entity (e.g., inventory storage within a plant). Transition nodes, 
besides denoting events, can be defined to represent actions (e.g., the steps in shipping materials) 
taken within the context of the system being modeled as a Petri net. 
Table 1 summarizes and defines the place nodes and the transition nodes in Figure 2.  
INSERT FIGURE 2 AND TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Finally, in a Petri net, the inherent relationship between pairs of place nodes is captured by 
directed arcs that connect one place node to a transition node to a second place node. Arcs within 
a Petri net, therefore, never link “like” nodes directly (i.e., arcs do not connect place nodes with 
place nodes or transition nodes with transition nodes), but rather multiple place nodes (which 
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represent locations in our example) may feed into a single transition node (which represents events 
in our approach). Note also that the place node from which an arc emanates is typically referred to 
as the input place node; whereas, the place node to which an arc points is typically referred to as 
the output place node. Place node m11 in Figure 2 is, therefore, an input place node connected to 
the four output place nodes of m12, m13, m14, and m15 through transition nodes a11. 
In addition to showing within-system interrelationships, the Petri net also facilities 
modeling of dynamic system behavior through the movement of “tokens” (tokens are shown in a 
Petri net as dots residing within place nodes). A transition node is “enabled” for token movement 
if the input place node contains at least one token. The movement of a token from the input place 
node(s) through the transition node to the output place nodes(s) will represent the initial location(s) 
or condition(s) in the input place node being transformed by an event in the transition node to a 
new location(s) or condition(s) in the output place node. Murata (1989) states that a token located 
in an input place node may be interpreted as holding “truth” for the condition associated with that 
place node, or a token may indicate that items or resources are available .For any place node, the 
number of resident tokens is a non-negative integer (i.e., {0, 1, 2, . . . ∞}). The movement of the 
token from the input place node, through the transition place node to the output place node is called 
the firing of the token (Murata 1989). A firing of an enabled transition removes tokens from the 
input place node(s) and places tokens to the output place node(s). An enabled transition may or 
may not fire, depending on whether or not the event actually takes place. Logic may be attached 
by embedding attributes into both the place nodes and the transition nodes and embedding of 
algorithms into the transition nodes (Blackhurst et al., 2005b; Wu et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2011). 
Attributes are specific information relevant to the context being represented by a Petri net. For a 
supply chain context, relevant attributes to embed into the place nodes may include information 
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such inventory level or processing time; attributes relevant to the transition nodes may include not 
only similar information or measures but others pertaining to occurrence of events (e.g., 
transportation time to ship from place node mi to mi’). Algorithms are the decision logic to 
dynamically update the attributes in the system. As tokens move through the basic Petri Net to 
reflect system changes, these attributes can be dynamically updated by algorithms embedded 
within transition nodes, with algorithms being mathematical operands or logical rules that, once 
executed, change the values of attributes embedded into a particular transition node.  The passing 
of tokens through a transition node, therefore, triggers the execution of one or more of these 
algorithms, which, then, results in an updating of attributes of interest.  
More formally, this can be stated as the following three steps: 
 
Attributes and Algorithms Development 
 
Step1 : For i = 1 to I, identify and define Ci = {ci1, ci2, . . ., cix} for place 
node mi, where ci1 . . . cix are specific attributes of interest.  
 
Step 2: For j = 1 to J, identify and define Dj = {d j1, d j2, . . ., d jy} for transition 
node aj, where d j1, d j2, . . ., d jy  are specific attributes of interest. 
 
Step 3: For j = 1 to J, identify and define Fj = {f j1, f j2, . . ., f jy} for transition 
node aj, where f j1, f j2, . . ., f jy  are specific logical or mathematical 
algorithms to update attributes of interest for place nodes. 
 
 
As an illustration, consider again the basic Petri Net in Figure 2.  Suppose we are interested 
in monitoring processing times and inventory levels along the supply chain.  Complying with Step 
1 of the Attributes and Algorithms Development, let Ci = {Cumulative Processing Time(i), 
Inventory(i)}, where Cumulative Processing Time(i) = Cumulative Processing Time (in hours) at mi 
and Inventory(i) = Inventory Level (in units) at mi.  Following Step 2 of the Attributes and 
Algorithms Development, define Dj = {Activity Processing Time( j ) }, where Activity Processing 
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Time( j )  = Processing Time (in hours) at transition node aj.  Finally, following Step 3 of the 
Attributes and Algorithms Development, let Fj = {Cumulative Processing Time(j), Replenishment 
(j)}, where Cumulative Processing Time(j) = [∀ input place nodes i (i.e., mi,’s) with arcs into 
transition node j (i.e., aj), compute Maximum{ciCumulative Processing Time} + d j Activity Processing Time] and  
Replenishment (j) = the rule: IF (Inventory(i) < reorder point at mi) THEN (invoke replenish order 
operation for place node mi (and update Inventory(i) accordingly).  
An enabled transition nodes fire, the attributes are updated through the algorithms and the 
tokens move through the system. In this way, tokens can allow the user dynamically describe the 
behavior of a system in terms of states and changes to states (Murata, 1989; Zurawski and Zhou, 
1994). Collectively, the distribution of tokens across place nodes within a Petri net at any time 
instance t can be said to describe or to mark the state of a Petri net represented system. This 
marking for the State at time St can, moreover, be written as an m-vector, with m being the number 
of place nodes within the Petri net and the numerical values in the vector denoting the number of 
tokens residing at the respective place nodes. Hence, the initial marking, 
S1=[0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0], with respect to Figure 2, denotes the presence of one token in 
place nodes m6, and m7. For a Petri net, a dynamic change is modeled as the movement of token(s) 
and the corresponding change in the marking S. This movement of tokens is triggered by the firing 
of one or more transition nodes, during which tokens in one or more input place nodes are moved 
through corresponding transition nodes into one or more output place nodes. The Petri net shown 
in Figure 2 with S1=[0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0], therefore, signals that items are ready to be 
shipped from Supplier 7 (m7) to Supplier 1, Supplier 2, and DC 3 and items are ready to be shipped 
from Supplier 6 (m6) to Supplier 1, Supplier 3, DC 2, and DC 3 and, consequently, triggers the 
firing of the corresponding transition nodes a1 and a7. Post-firing, tokens would move through the 
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transition nodes and end up in the output place nodes, resulting in a new state at t=2 with a marking 
given by S2=[1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0]. Logic may be embedded into the nodes allowing tokens 
to be added to indicate that the transition node (event) affected multiple output places nodes 
(locations). For example, in our application of Petri nets we are interested in the flow of products 
in the supply chain and how a disruption may propagate to all possible states, so the tokens in the 
initial state locations at Supplier 6 (m6) and Supplier 7 (m7) will be fired to all possible output 
place nodes (Supplier 1, Supplier 2, Supplier 3, DC2 and DC 3). The use of attributes and 
algorithms is limited in our application to understanding propagation paths resulting from the 
design of the supply chain. Future work may enhance the use of the attributes and algorithms as 
discussed at the end of this paper.  
Supply Chain Vulnerability Assessment  
For the Petri net to be useful in a supply chain disruption context, we create a Node Dependency 
Matrix and apply a clustering algorithm in order to understand vulnerability of the supply chain 
caused by the design of the supply chain. We extend the prior use of Petri nets from just looking 
at which nodes a disruption will impact as in Wu et al. (2007), to a deeper understanding of 
vulnerability in the supply chain. We also go beyond prior work using Petri nets to determine 
conflict in a supply chain using a hierarchical Petri net approach where entities in the supply chain 
are combined into a supply chain context (Blackhurst et al., 2008). The hierarchical Petri net 
developed by Blackhurst et al. (2008) determines if a marking is reachable from an initial marking 
giving the combination of entities in order to identify conflicts in the supply chain. In this work, 
we specifically examine how the structure, connectivity and dependence within the supply chain 
impact vulnerability. We develop a Node Dependency (ND) Matrix, a k×k incidence matrix (Gk×k), 
is constructed to enumerate all dependencies between place nodes and transition nodes for a given 
 12 
Petri net, with these dependencies being the input into the TCA. In other words, the ND Matrix re-
represents the Petri net model in terms of a matrix, which allows the supply chain dependencies to 
be understood and manipulated though a clustering algorithm. TCA then aptly identifies clusters 
based on the sequencing or precedence among nodes (Steward, 1981; Kusiak et al., 1995; 
Kusiak ,1999), with the clusters being stipulated as either levels or cycles. We apply these 
understanding dependencies, levels and clusters to a supply chain in order to gain insights in the 
vulnerability of the system.  
A level is a grouping of n place nodes and/or transition nodes where n≥1, with nodes within 
the level being connected to one another in a defined precedence structure. The set of nodes within 
one level can also be connected to the set of nodes of another level in a precedence structure. 
Hence, levels are numbered to indicate their sequence with a lower-numbered level being a 
precedent to the next higher-number level. For example, the set of nodes constituting Level 3 
should precede the set of nodes constituting Level 4 which should precede the set of nodes 
constituting Level 5 and so forth. Moreover, the first level (Level 1) and the last level that TCA 
identifies are somewhat unique because they only contain place nodes with Level 1 place nodes 
all being input nodes that anchor the beginning point of a Petri net and the nodes in the last level 
all being output nodes that anchor the ending point of a Petri net. 
A cycle, like a level, is a grouping of n place nodes and/or transition nodes where n ≥ 2. 
Like nodes within a level, those within the cycle also have a defined precedence structure. A cycle 
differs, however, from a level in that the precedence structure connecting nodes in a cycle creates 
a closed loop of interconnected nodes. Cycles differ, moreover, from levels such that their 
numberings are for convenience and do not reflect a sequencing structure. Cycle 2, therefore, does 
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not precede Cycle 3 nor does it follow Cycle 1. Finally, for some Petri nets, TCA may identify a 
set of nodes to be both a cycle and, concurrently, a level or to be a cycle subsumed within a level. 
Procedurally, applying the TCA to a given Petri net involves the following steps: 
Development of the Petri Net Model and Node Dependency (ND) Matrix  
and Application of the Triangularization Clustering Algorithm (TCA) 
 
Step 1:  Construct the Petri Net Model representation 
[a] Represent place nodes as circles and transitions nodes as 
rectangles. Arcs, drawn as arrows, connect place nodes and 
transition node.  
• Arcs within a Petri net never link “like” nodes 
directly. Place nodes may feed into a single transition 
node.  
• The place node from which an arc emanates is 
typically referred to as the input place node; whereas, 
the place node to which an arc points is typically 
referred to as the output place node. 
[b] Initialize the marking S1 noting the initial placement of the 
tokens. 
[c] Subsequent states of the network are influenced by the 
transition firing 
• A transition is enabled if the input place node has a 
token 
• An enabled transition may or may not fire depending 
upon the logic embedded in the node. In addition, the 
placement of the marking(s) into the output place 
node(s) is determined by the logic in the transition 
nodes.  
 
Step 2: Construct the Gk×k ND Matrix:  
[a] Let the rows and the columns of the Gk×k ND Matrix 
represent the k place and transition nodes, such that each cell 
(i.e., row-column combination) along the diagonal of Gk×k 
denotes the same kth node and such that each cell off the 
diagonal of Gk×k denotes a pairing of the node in the row and 
the node in the column. 
[b] In the cells along the diagonals of Gk×k, enter a “+”; in the 
cells off the diagonal, enter a “1” if the node in the column 
is an output node for the node in the row. 
 
Step 3: Identify and sorting of origin nodes and destination nodes:  
[a] Identify either an origin node or a destination node.  
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Note:  An origin node is a node for which no other node 
precedes it; a destination node is a node for which no other 
node occurs after it. In the ND Matrix, if the ith column of the 
ND Matrix has only one nonempty entry (a diagonal entry), 
then i is an origin node; if the jth row of the ND Matrix has 
only one nonempty entry (a diagonal entry), then j is a 
destination state. 
• If no origin or destination nodes exist, proceed to Step 4.  
 [b] Underline the node identified in Step 3[a].  
[c]       Apply the Sorting Rules (below) to the underlined node.  
• If the identified node is an origin node, then move it to 
the farthest left position before the sequence of the nodes 
that are not underlined. 
• If the identified node is a destination node, then move it 
to the farthest right position after the sequence of the 
nodes that are not underlined. 
[d]       Repeat Step 3[a]. 
 
Step 4: Identification of Clusters:  
[a]       For any remaining nodes in the ND matrix (those that have  
not been identified as origin nodes or destination nodes), 
identify an existing cycle.  
Note: A cycle exists if there is a path starting with the node 
and ending with the node (e.g., Place Node 2Transition 
Node 3Place Node 2). 
• If no cycles exist, proceed to Step 5.  
 [b] Merge all the activities in the cycle into one node by merging the  
corresponding rows and columns in the cycle into a single row and  
column. Designate this node as a cycle and note the nodes within 
the cycle. 
[c] Return to Step 4[a].  
 
Step 5: Identification of Levels: 
Assign the nodes and cycles in the ND matrix to levels (1 to n) from 
the upper left corner of the ND Matrix going to the lower right 
corner of the ND Matrix according to the precedence relationships 
(where level 1 precedes level 2 which is followed by level 3, etc.). 
Note that level 1 will be the node or nodes identified in the first pass 
of Step 3[c] of origin nodes moved to the farthest left position. Level 
n will be the nodes identified in the first pass of Step 3[c] of 
destination nodes moved to the farthest left position. Levels between 
1 and n will be the nodes and cycles moved in subsequent steps.  
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Table 2 identifies the 26×26 ND Matrix (i.e., G26×26) corresponding to Figure 1; Table 3 
reveals the 11 levels and 2 cycles embedded within the Petri net representation of the Service Parts 
Supply Chain. With the exceptions of Level 3 and Level 7, which also correspond to Cycle 1 and 
Cycle 2 respectively, the remaining 11 levels generally alternate between sets of place nodes and 
sets of transition nodes. 
  INSERT TABLE 2 AND TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Next, we discuss the results of this example using the proposed methodological approach 
to assess the vulnerability for the supply chain.  
INSIGHTS FOR THE SERVICE PARTS SUPPLY CHAIN USING THE PROPOSED 
TOOL 
 
By applying the approach to the Service Parts Supply Chain example, three insights about 
the structure of this supply chain, with implications how to manage supply chain disruptions, 
become readily evident. 
Levels: Connected clusters vulnerable to disruption spread 
The Service Parts Supply Chain depicted in Figure 1 has 11 levels, with each level having 
between 1 (e.g., Level 4 as show in Table 3) and 8 (i.e., Level 3 as shown in Table 3) place nodes 
and/or transition nodes. This insight provides some pragmatic advice concerning the magnitude of 
investments that would need to be made in order to actively manage all the entire Service Parts 
Supply Chain. Assuming a one-to-one match and that the number of place nodes and/or transition 
nodes for a level has negligible effects, this Service Parts Supply Chain would require at least 11 
“monitors,” one for each level, with a monitor, in this case, being a human or a technology-based 
resource given the responsibility to keep watch over the set of place nodes and/or transition nodes 
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for a particular level.2 These monitoring resources contribute to the warning capability of a supply 
chain, allowing for the detection of a pending or a realized disruptive event and the subsequent 
dissemination of relevant information to all relevant entities within this Service Parts Supply Chain 
(Craighead et al., 2007). This would be of particular use to purchasing and supply managers who 
need to decide where and how to utilize limited resources in managing supply chain risk 
(Hoffmann et al., 2013).  
The 11 levels, moreover, pinpoint a precise propagation path for a disruptive event 
occurring within this Service Parts Supply Chain. Since the levels are themselves sequenced (i.e., 
a level with a lower number precedes one with a higher number), a disruptive event affecting one 
or more place nodes and/or transition nodes within Level N would propagate and affect the place 
nodes and/or transition nodes within Level N+1, then those within Level N+2, and so on until an 
intervention successfully stops the spread. Hence, if Supplier 6 (i.e., place node m6 in Level 1 from 
Table 3) were to experience a disastrous fire that shuts down its production capabilities, one or 
more nodes in Level 2 onwards would be negatively affected, with this disruptive event at Supplier 
6 eventually affecting one or more nodes in all levels unless mitigation initiatives such as inventory 
and capacity buffering had been deployed or such as materials flow rerouting can be deployed. In 
this regard, understanding the number, as well as the sequencing, of levels for a supply chain can 
contribute to the development, within a supply chain, of what Pettit et al. (2010) refers to as 
anticipation capabilities. 
                                                 
 
2 Naturally, the number of place nodes and/or transitions nodes within levels should also play a 
role in determining how many monitoring resources are necessary. A level with a large number 
may benefit from more than one “monitor”; conversely, a single “monitor” may be able to keep 
watch over multiple levels, with each level having only a small number of constituent nodes (e.g., 
one). 
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Interestingly, there are six levels which only consist of one node: level 4 (m3: supplier 3), 
level 5 (a6: shipping from supplier 3); level 7 (m10: DC 3), level 8 (a10: shipping from DC 3); level 
9 (m11: the manufacturing facility); and level 10 (a11: shipping from the manufacturing facility). 
While node m11 (the manufacturing facility) can be easily identified from Figure 1, the other 5 
vulnerable points are not as obvious from Figure 1 (nor was it obvious to the supply chain 
managers of the U.S. heavy equipment manufacturer). We term these nodes and arcs “critical” to 
indicate they represent highly vulnerable points of the supply chain because these nodes represent 
a single node level (a level identified using TCA which only has one node) with multiple inputs 
and multiple outputs. In other words, if the node is compromised, it could potentially shut down 
entire portions of the supply chain. For example, level 9 which consists only of node m11 
(Manufacturing Facility) or level 10 which consists of only a11 (shipping from the manufacturing 
facility). If the manufacturing facility was shut down due to a labor strike or fire, it could shut 
down the entire chain. Likewise, if the shipping lane from the manufacturing facility was shut 
down due to labor issues or an accident, this also has the potential to disrupt delivery to the 
customer. These single nodes may be viewed as a bottleneck which could affect ALL of the dealers. 
 This feature of the proposed methodological approach helps purchasing and supply 
managers to quickly understand vulnerable points in the supply chain. For example, Melnyk et al. 
(2010) call for tools to identify possible weak points in the supply chain and Knemeyer et al. (2009) 
discuss the need to identify “key locations” in the development of a proactive planning process. 
We envision the identification of critical nodes and arcs being used to help identify these 
vulnerable points in the supply chain. These bottleneck points in the network should be a red flag 
to supply chain managers indicating increased vulnerability to have a single node shut down large 
portions of their supply chain. These nodes should be monitored more closely and have extra 
 18 
resources on hand or close by. These nodes should also be identified as candidates for multiple 
sourcing or back up mitigation methods.  
Cycles: Clusters with multiple nodes vulnerable to circular disruption impact 
Besides the 11 levels, the Service Parts Supply Chain in Figure 1 also supports two cycles, 
with Cycle 1 (corresponds to Level 3) involving shipment of items between Supplier 1 (m1) and 
Supplier 5 (m5) that go through Supplier 4 (m4) and Supplier 2 (m2) and Cycle 2 (corresponds to 
Level 7) involving shipments of items between Distribution Center 1 (m8) and Distribution Center 
2 (m9) and with neither cycle representing situations of rework (i.e., items being sent back up the 
supply chain to be fixed or repaired or disposed of). This insight raises questions regarding the 
design of the Service Parts Supply Chain product flow. One immediate question is why these 
cycles are present in the Service Parts Supply Chain? Why do these cycles even exist? Since the 
two cycles connect place nodes and/or transition nodes for the Service Parts Supply Chain in a 
closed loop. It is possible that supply chains will have cycles due to the additive nature of the 
product. Thus, a supplier may add value to a product, send it to a partner who, in turn, modifies 
the product and returns it to the supplier. Therefore, it may be argued that the product is no longer 
the same, but some supply chain networks may have inefficiencies and risk of disruption due 
cyclical nature of their supply networks. For example, Scheibe and Blackhurst (2017) describe 
cyclical risks caused by the structure of a supply chain network that allow disruptions to grow 
through a feedback effect. 
Cycle 2 questions the need to maintain two Distribution Centers that are apparently quite 
involved in sending materials back and forth to one another and suggests that there may be an 
opportunity to redesign this portion of the Service Parts Supply Chain. Assuming no geographical 
restrictions, collapsing two Distribution Centers into one, perhaps at a more appropriately 
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centralized location, can reduce not only the complexity in the Service Parts Supply Chain but also 
in monetary and physical investments of safety stock inventory. Cycle 1, for another, questions 
the possibility of a supply chain redesign so that supplier 1 ships to supplier 5 directly rather than 
going through supplier 4 and 2.  
Cycles, from a pragmatic perspective, reveal potential issues about structure of a supply 
chain and the associated flow of materials with the supply chain. In other words, cycles show 
possible redundancies and poor supply chain design and may even be viewed as raising a flag 
indicating supply chain complexity. It may be beneficial to simplify the supply chain and eliminate 
unnecessary redundancies.  
DISCUSSION  
 The importance of managing supply chain vulnerability cannot be overstated. A single disruption 
can halt not only the flow of material affecting the tier of the supply chain where the disruption 
occurs, but also the material flow across the entire supply chain (Rice and Caniato, 2003). The 10-
minute fire in March, 2000 at a Philips semiconductor plant disrupted the supply of a critical part 
for cell phone manufacturing that resulted in a $400 million loss for Ericsson (Latour, 2001). 
Research has provided additional evidence attesting to the harmful effects of supply chain 
disruptions on operational and financial performance with both immediate and long term effects 
(Deane et al., 2009; Blackhurst et al., 2011). A single (and even seemingly minor) supply chain 
disruption can cause the failure of the entire supply chain (Kern et al., 2012), and firms affected 
by supply chain disruptions can expect a reduction in their operating income, return on sales, and 
return on assets by 107%, 114%, and 93%, respectively, with a consequent decrease in shareholder 
wealth by 10% in the short term and 40% in the long term (Hendricks and Singhal, 2003, Hendricks 
and Singhal, 2005a, Hendricks and Singhal, 2005b). 
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 The ability to understand supply chain vulnerability allows for better decision making 
regarding risk exposure (Wagner and Bode, 2006; Wagner and Neshat, 2012). As such, we contend 
that negative impacts from supply chain disruptions are a manifestation of the vulnerability of the 
supply chain. To address this issue, we have proposed and illustrated the use of an approach to 
visualize the supply chain and analyze areas of vulnerability. By doing so, we are able to pre-
emptively identify vulnerable locations in the supply chain before a disruption occurs by analyzing 
the network based on a deeper understanding of the network structure. Furthermore, it is critical 
to understand how factors like the connectivity and design of a supply chain affect supply chain 
vulnerability (Wagner and Bode, 2006; Pettit et al., 2010; Pettit et al., 2013). The methodological 
approach in this research enables purchasing and supply managers to visualize a supply chain, 
determine vulnerabilities to disruptive events, and expose the propagation path of a supply chain 
disruption without overly simplifying assumptions. Therefore, the contribution of our paper is that 
we combine Petri Nets with a clustering algorithm (Triangularization Clustering Algorithm) in 
order to assess the vulnerability of a supply chain to a disruption (and the disruption propagating 
through the supply chain) based on the structure of the supply chain. This combined approach 
provides novel insights into how the structure of a supply chain can impede or enable a disruption 
to propagate. The focus of our approach is with the structural view of the supply chain, and because 
it takes an agnostic view for disruption propagation (cf. Garvey et al., 2015), it is scalable to 
various sourcing scenarios. Additionally, the contribution of this research being grounded in 
supply network structure brings value to both purchasing and supply management as well as supply 
chain risk management. 
The contribution of this research to purchasing and supply management may first be shown 
through enhancing the ability of purchasing and supply managers to test and implement strategies 
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to mitigate the risk of disruption, especially in large-scale systems where the propagation path of 
a disruption is not intuitively obvious. Conversely, it will also show where there is a lack of 
dependency—that is, it helps purchasing and supply managers identify areas of the network that 
would not be affected by a disruption and hence do not need immediate attention. The closed-loop 
system design allows users to better identify sources and reoccurrences of disruptions, which 
enhances supply chain managers’ ability to break the disruption cycle.  
Second, in a supply chain disruption context, levels provided by the methodological 
approach illustrate which nodes in the supply chain are immediately affected by a disruption and 
how the disruption, if unchecked, will propagate through different entities in a supply chain. A 
purchasing and supply manager may use these levels and cycles to more accurately predict where 
the vulnerable points in the supply chain exist, given a disruption at any point within the supply 
chain, and to focus recovery efforts in those portions of the supply chain that are most vulnerable 
to that disruption given an expected propagation path. Understanding levels and cycles will help 
purchasing and supply managers better allocate limited resources such as buffer inventories. Use 
of the attribute and algorithm set briefly discussed in Section 2 will help purchasing and supply 
managers understand the depth of impact a disruption has and the effectiveness of a mitigation 
strategy on that disruption.  
The contribution of this research to supply chain risk managers is also found in the levels 
and cycles. Levels are valuable in understanding where and how to allocate scarce resources to 
“shore up” vulnerable areas of the system, and cycles illustrate recursive loops in the supply chain 
design. Moreover, as tokens move through the Petri net reflect system changes, these attributes 
can be dynamically updated by mathematical operands or logical rules in the form of algorithms 
embedded within transition nodes, that once executed, change the values of attributes in specific 
 22 
transition nodes. The passing of tokens through a transition node, therefore, triggers the execution 
of one or more of these algorithms, which results in an updating of attributes of interest.  
For example, adding safety stock may be investigated to understand the resilience of a 
supply chain to a disruption. The logic triggered could also be directed towards contractual 
negotiations. The Petri net may embed logic that would cause a supplier to also hold additional 
safety stock or contract for a quantity discount. These types of choices are representative of actual 
supply chains, but are very difficult or impossible to model in traditional network optimization 
methods. As such, it is common practice to constrain traditional models via assumptions, and while 
this allows for a network model to be solved, it becomes less realistic and therefore less useful. 
Additionally, points of vulnerability in the supply chain and hidden cyclical dependencies, where 
a disruption may self-propagate over and over within a loop of nodes, are exposed, allowing 
purchasing and supply managers to assess risk, understand supply chain structures, and make 
informed decisions on allocation of resources and supply chain redesign. 
The levels and cycles provided by the methodological approach also help us understand 
that the design of a supply chain may impacts its level of vulnerability. Certainly, tradeoffs do 
exist, and managers need to be keenly aware that actions to reduce one risk may raise the impact 
or likelihood of other types of risk (Chopra and Sodhi, 2004). For example, while combining the 
two Distribution Centers into one (in our example application) may reduce the complexity of 
cycles in the supply chain design, it might not account for other risks like a natural disaster or a 
strike affecting the single Distribution Center. Our approach can be used as an input into predictive 
supply chain vulnerability analysis.  
We envision our methodological approach being used by supply chain risk managers to 
perform pre-emptive analysis (as advocated by Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Melnyk et al., 2010; 
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Kirilmaz and Erol, 2017) to determine how reconfiguring the design of the supply chain influences 
vulnerability. By using this approach, a supply chain and purchasing manager can better allocate 
resources and share information in a more informed manner as he or she has a better understanding 
of how nodes in the network (supply chain) are related. It is wasteful to allocate resources (e.g., 
extra inventory) to a node that is not immediately in the propagation path of disruption. 
CONCLUSION 
Hendricks and Singhal (2003) note that the negative consequences of a disruption amplify 
and grow the longer it is untreated. Thus, it is of great importance to reduce risk in the supply base 
(Blackhurst et al. 2008). This sentiment is echoed by Tomlin (2006, pg. 650) who said, “extra 
capacity is of little value if a disruption is nearly over by the time capacity is available.” In fact, 
supply chain resources are often constrained and costly, so managers want to know where supply 
chains are most vulnerable in order to strategically place and effectively use scarce resources 
(Wagner and Bode, 2008; Kern et al., 2012). To that end, we developed a methodological approach 
using Petri net and TCA allowing purchasing and supply managers to evaluate a network and 
discover potentially vulnerable points. We envision the use of this approach as a supply chain 
vulnerability diagnostic tool to help supply chain managers analyze the supply network to discover 
vulnerabilities and adjust accordingly to avoid disruptions. When a disruption occurs, the manager 
needs to quickly determine what effects it will have on the network including the propagation path 
as well as the impact (Blackhurst et al., 2005a). Similarly, Melnyk et al. (2010) call for 
development of systems to map the supply chain and develop “what-if” or war room analysis. It is 
of utmost importance for supply chain members to cooperate to mitigate the risk of exposure in 
specific locations (Knemeyer et al. 2009). In this manner, our method can be used for proactive 
supply chain risk management as a way to understand where the structure of the supply chain may 
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lead to exposure or vulnerability of the supply chain to disruptions. There may also be 
opportunities to use this approach for supplier selection purposes where purchasing and supply 
managers can better understand critical nodes and supply chain design (structure) issues when 
comparing multiple suppliers, deciding where and when to dual source, determining facility 
location and sourcing strategies. We encourage practitioners to use the method proposed in this 
paper to step back and examine the structure of the network as a whole and thus reduce risk 
exposure.  
To gain more insights into the real world usefulness of our proposed method, we presented 
our findings to two additional companies to get feedback on application opportunities. One firm is 
in the same industry as our example firm and the other is a large furniture manufacturer. Both 
firms saw great value in understanding how the structure, connectivity and dependence could yield 
insights into the vulnerability of complex supply chains. The furniture manufacturer suggested 
future work could add a timing component into the model that would show how resources are 
consumed over time in the face of a disruption. The company termed it “the clock is ticking” 
approach and gave the example that if we added inventory levels to the transition nodes, one could 
see how many hours/days until the buffer resource was consumed, amplifying the disruption 
impact. The suggestion from the firm in the same industry was to use our model at an increased 
level of granularity -- within a single plant. The company described having many value streams 
within a single plant and wanting a way to understand how changing products (and flows) within 
their mixed model scheduling system would impact the overall network. 
Effective use of level and cycles will yield better predictions of disruption propagation and, 
therefore, the vulnerability of the supply chain is better understood. However, we recognize that 
there is no one size fits all solution to managing supply chain vulnerability. Future work in this 
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area should include the following issues: First is the potential for state explosion. The larger and 
more complex the supply chain, the more cumbersome the construction of the network and the 
more unwieldy its ND Matrix becomes. Additionally, the use of more tokens in the system 
increases the complexity of the analysis. Second, while the Petri net allows logic to better represent 
human decision making, trying to account for every contingency can make the transition node 
logic unwieldy or even self-contradictory, but that is intrinsic in the contractual agreements 
themselves, and not an artifact of the Petri net. However, it must be acknowledged to add to the 
potential complexity of our methodological approach. Generating stochastic continuous Petri nets 
will manifest as Markov processes, and it would be worth adding probabilities of failures at nodes 
and links to gain a richer understanding of the vulnerabilities of a supply chain network.  
There are several interesting extensions to the methodological approach that could be 
developed. For example, Zhang et al. (2011) identify the need for future research to model 
uncertainty in the supply chain and propose the use of tools to augment Petri nets such as fuzzy 
logic. These extensions should be investigated to develop more informative results for supply 
chain managers and could influence how and when mitigation strategies are deployed. Another 
interesting topic worthy of exploration is mining the network structure to identify important 
patterns. Such patterns can identify a sub-network, which can allow the user to explore that portion 
of the supply chain in greater depth while helping to address the challenge of scalability. Yet 
another opportunity is to add dimensions of node criticality and timing (delays and stoppages of 
flow) into the Petri net model (as discussed in the discussion section) as well as using tokens to 
represent resources (Murata, 1989) as opposed to material flow. Another extension would be to 
run “what-if” scenarios with the model to test vulnerability under difference scenarios or 
circumstances (Hwarng and Xie, 2008). What if different locations or suppliers were added, for 
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example? This research could also be used to investigate varying levels of node failure. Instead of 
a complete failure, what would be the effect if a node had a partial failure? In addition, the method 
proposed in this paper does not account for single versus multiple suppliers, volumes, costs, lead 
times, difficult to re-source suppliers and component criticality. A supplement to our method 
(extending beyond our focus on supply chain structure) would be to add additional nuances and 
complexity into the method. Finally, a backward tracing of the flow in the model can help with 
issues related to traceability and pinpointing the origin of risk occurrences in the supply chain. 
  
 27 
REFERENCES  
 
Ambulkar, S., Blackhurst, J., Grawe, S., 2015. Firm Resilience to Supply Chain Disruptions: 
Scale Development and Empirical Examination. Journal of Operations Management (33-34), 
111-122. 
 
Bhamra, R., Dani, S., Burnard, K., 2011. Resilience: the concept, a literature review and future 
directions. International Journal of Production Research 49(18), 5375-5393. 
 
Blackhurst, J., Craighead, C., Elkins, D., Handfield, R., 2005a. An Empirically Derived Agenda 
for Quantitative Tools to Analyze and Reduce Supply Chain Disruption Impacts. International 
Journal of Production Research 43(19), 4067–4081. 
 
Blackhurst, J., Wu, T., Craighead, C. W, 2008. A systematic approach for supply chain conflict 
detection with a hierarchical Petri Net extension. Omega 36(5), 680-696. 
 
Blackhurst, J., Wu, T., O’Grady, P., 2004. Network-Based Approach to Modeling Uncertainty in 
a Supply Chain. International Journal of Production Research 42(8), 1639–1658. 
 
Blackhurst, J., Wu, T., O’Grady, P., 2005. PCDM: A Decision Support Modeling Methodology 
for Supply Chain, Product, and Process Design Decisions. Journal of Operations Management 
23(3-4), 46–53.  
 
Blackhurst, J. V., Scheibe, K. P., Johnson, D. J., 2008. Supplier risk assessment and monitoring 
for the automotive industry. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics 
Management, 38(2), 143-165. 
 
Blackhurst J., Dunn, K., Craighead, C., 2011. An Empirically-Derived Framework of Global 
Supply Resiliency. Journal of Business Logistics 32(4), 374-391. 
 
Chapman, P., Christopher, M., Juttner, U., Peck, H., Wilding, R., 2002. Identifying and managing 
supply chain vulnerability, Focus May, 59–64. 
 
Chen, H., Amodeo, L., Chu, F., 2005. Batch Deterministic and Stochastic Petri nets: A Tool for 
Modeling and Performance Evaluation of a Supply Chain. IEEE Transactions on Automation 
Science and Engineering 2(2), 78–83. 
 
Cheng, X.Q., Ren, F.X., Zhou, S. and Hu, M.B., 2009. Triangular clustering in document 
networks. New Journal of Physics, 11(3), p.033019. 
 
Chong, A. Y. L., Liu, M. J., Luo, J., Keng-Boon, O., 2015. Predicting RFID adoption in healthcare 
supply chain from the perspectives of users. International Journal of Production Economics 159, 
66-75. 
 
Chopra, S., Sodhi, M., 2004. Managing Risk to Avoid Supply-Chain Breakdown. MIT Sloan 
Management Review 46(1), 53–61.  
 28 
 
Craighead, C., Blackhurst, J., Rungtusanatham, M., Handfield, R., 2007. The Severity of Supply 
Chain Disruptions: Design Characteristics and Mitigation Capabilities. Decision Sciences Journal 
38(1), 131–156. 
 
de Oliveira, M. P. V., McCormack, K., Trkman, P., 2012. Business analytics in supply chains–
The contingent effect of business process maturity. Expert Systems with Applications 39(5), 
5488-5498. 
 
Deane, J., Craighead, C., Ragsdale, C., 2009. Mitigating environmental and density risk in global 
sourcing. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management 39(10), 861-
883. 
 
Fridgen, G., Stepanek, C. Wolf, T., 2015. Investigation of exogenous shocks in complex supply 
networks–a modular Petri Net approach. International Journal of Production Research 53(5), 
1387-1408. 
 
Garvey, M.D., Carnovale, S. and Yeniyurt, S., 2015. An analytical framework for supply network 
risk propagation: A Bayesian network approach. European Journal of Operational 
Research, 243(2), 618-627. 
 
Ghadge, A., Dani, S., Kalawsky, R., 2012. Supply chain risk management: present and future 
scope. The International Journal of Logistics Management 23(3), 313-339. 
 
Giannakis, M., Louis, M., 2011. A multi-agent based framework for supply chain risk management. 
Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management 17, 23-31.  
 
Griffis, S., Bell, J., Closs, D., 2012. Metaheuristics in Logistics and Supply Chain Management. 
Journal of Business Logistics 33(2), 90-106.  
 
Hendricks, K., Singhal, V., 2003. The Effect of Supply Chain Glitches on Shareholder Wealth. 
Journal of Operations Management 21(5), 501–522.  
 
Hendricks, K., Singhal, V., 2005a. An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Supply Chain 
Disruptions on Long Run Stock Price Performance and Equity Risk of the Firm. Production and 
Operations Management Journal 14(1), 35–52. 
 
Hendricks, K., Singhal, V., 2005b. Association between Supply Chain Glitches and Operating 
Performance. Management Science 51(5), 695–711. 
 
Hoffmann, P., Schiele, H., Krabbendam, K., 2013. Uncertainty, supply risk management and their 
impact on performance. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management 19, 199-211.  
 
Hwarng H., Xie N., 2008. Understanding supply chain dynamics: a chaos perspective. European 
Journal of Operations Research 184(3), 1163–1178. 
 
 29 
Jüttner, U., Maklan, S., 2011. Supply chain resilience in the global financial crisis: an empirical 
study. Supply Chain Management: An International Journal 16(4), 246-259. 
 
Kern. D., Moser, R., Hartmann, E., Moder, M., 2012. Supply Risk Management: Model 
Development and Empirical Analysis. International Journal of Physical Distribution and 
Logistics Management 42(1), 60-82.  
 
Kirilmaz, O., Erol., S., 2017. A proactive approach to supply chain risk management: Shifting 
orders among suppliers to mitigate supply side risks. Journal of Purchasing and Supply 
Management 23, 54-65. 
 
Knemeyer, A., Zinn, W., Eroglu, C., 2009. Proactive planning for catastrophic events in supply 
chains. Journal of Operations Management 27, 141–153.  
 
Kusiak, A., Wang, J., He, D., Feng, C.-X., 1995. A Structured Approach for Analysis of Design 
Processes, IEEE Transactions on Components, Packaging, and Manufacturing Technology–Part 
A 18(3), 664–673. 
  
Kusiak, A. 1999. Engineering Design: Products, Processes and Systems. Academic Press, San 
Diego, CA. 
 
Latour, A. 2001. Trial by Fire: A Blaze in Albuquerque Sets Off Major Crisis for Cell-Phone 
Giants. Wall Street Journal, January 29, A1. 
 
Lindsey, C., Frei, A., Mahmassani, H. S., Park, Y. W., Klabjan, D., Reed, M., Langheim, G., 
Keating, T., 2014. Predictive Analytics to Improve Pricing and Sourcing in Third-Party Logistics 
Operations. Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board, 
2410(1), 123-131. 
 
Manuj, I., Mentzer, J. T., 2008. Global Supply chain disruption risk management. Journal of 
Business Logistics 29(1), 133–155. 
 
Melnyk, S., Davis, E., Spekman, R., Sandor, J., 2010. Outcome-driven supply chains. MIT Sloan 
Management Review 51(2), 32-38.  
 
Memari, A., Rahim, A. R. A., Ahmad, R. B., 2015. An Integrated Production-distribution 
Planning in Green Supply Chain: A Multi-objective Evolutionary Approach. Procedia CIRP 26, 
700-705. 
 
Min, H., Zhou, G., 2002. Supply Chain Modeling: Past, Present and Future. Computers & 
Industrial Engineering 43, 231–249.  
 
Mizgier, K., Juttner, M., Wagner, S., 2013. Bottleneck identification in supply chain networks. 
International Journal of Production Research 51(5), 1477-1490.  
Murata, T. 1989. Petri-Nets: Properties, Analysis and Applications. Proceedings of the IEEE 77(4), 
541–580. 
 30 
 
Nair, A., Vidal, J. M. 2011. Supply Network Topology and Robustness Against Disruptions – An 
Investigation Using Multi-Agent Model. International Journal of Production Research 49(5),  
1391-1404. 
 
Pettit, T., Fiskel, J., Croxton, K., 2010. Ensuring Supply Chain Resilience: Development of a 
Conceptual Framework. Journal of Business Logistics 21(1), 1-21.  
 
Pettit, T., Fiskel, J., Croxton, K., 2013. Ensuring Supply Chain Resilience: Development and 
Implementation of an Assessment Tool. Journal of Business Logistics 34(1), 46-76.  
 
Rice, J., Caniato, F., 2003. Building a Secure and Resilient Supply Chain. Supply Chain 
Management Review 7(5), 22–30.  
 
Sahay, B. S., Ranjan, J., 2008. Real time business intelligence in supply chain analytics. 
Information Management & Computer Security 16(1), 28-48. 
 
Schank, T., Wagner, D., 2004. Approximating clustering-coefficient and transitivity. Universität 
Karlsruhe, Fakultät für Informatik. 
 
Scheibe, K.P. and Blackhurst, J., 2017. Supply chain disruption propagation: a systemic risk and 
normal accident theory perspective. International Journal of Production Research, (in press) 
pp.1-17. 
 
Skipper, J. B., Hanna, J. B. ,2009. Minimizing supply chain disruption risk through enhanced 
flexibility. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management 39(5), 404-
427. 
 
Sodhi, M. S., Son, B. G., Tang, C. S., 2012. Researchers' perspectives on supply chain risk 
management. Production and Operations Management 21(1), 1-13. 
 
Souza, G. C., 2014. Supply chain analytics. Business Horizons 57(5), 595-605. 
 
Steward, D. V., 1981. Systems Analysis and Management: Structure, Strategy, and Design. 
Petrocelli Books, New York, NY. 
 
Tang, C. S., 2006. Robust strategies for mitigating supply chain disruptions. International Journal 
of Logistics: Research and Applications 9(1), 33-45. 
  
Tang, C. S., Zimmerman, J. D., Nelson, J. I., 2009. Managing new product development and 
supply chain risks: The boeing 787 case., Supply Chain Forum: an International Journal, 10(1), 
74-86. 
 
Tomlin, B., 2006. On the Value of Mitigation and Contingency Strategies for Managing Supply 
Chain Disruption Risks. Management Science 52(5), 639–657. 
 
 31 
Tuncel, G., Alpan, G. 2010. Risk assessment and management for supply chain networks: A case 
study. Computers in Industry 61, 250-259. 
 
Van der Vegt, G. S., Essens, P., Walstrom, M., George, G., 2015. Managing Risk and Resilience. 
Academy of Management Journal, 58(4), 971-980.  
 
Venkatesh, K., Zhou, M., Kaighobadi, M., Caudill, R. 1996. A Petri net Approach to Investigating 
Push and Pull Paradigms in Flexible Factory Automated Systems. International Journal of 
Production Research, 34(3), 595-620.  
 
Wagner, S., Bode, C., 2006. An Empirical Investigation into Supply Chain Vulnerability. Journal 
of Purchasing and Supply Management 12, 301-312.  
 
Wagner, S, Bode, C., 2008. An Empirical Examination of Supply Chain Performance Along 
Several Dimensions of Risk. Journal of Business Logistics 29(1), 307-325.  
 
Wagner, S., Neshat, N., 2010. Assessing the Vulnerability of Supply Chains Using Graph Theory. 
International Journal of Production Economics 126, 121-129.  
 
Wagner, S., Neshat, N., 2012. A comparison of supply chain vulnerability indices for different 
categories of firms. International Journal of Production Research 50, 1-15.  
 
Waller, M. A., Fawcett, S. E., 2013a. Data Science, Predictive Analytics and Big Data: A 
Revolution That Will Transform Supply Chain Design and Management. Journal of Business 
Logistics 34(2), 77-84.  
 
Waller, M. A., Fawcett, S. E., 2013b. Click Here for a Data Scientist: Big Data, Predictive 
Analytics, and Theory Development in the Era of a Maker Movement Supply Chain., Journal of 
Business Logistics 34(4), 249-252. 
 
Wu, T., Blackhurst, J., O’Grady, P., 2007. A Methodology for Supply Chain Disruption 
Analysis. International Journal of Production Research 45(7), 1665-1682. 
 
Yan, P., Zhou, M., Hu, B., Feng, Z., 1999. Modeling and Control of Workstation Level 
Information Flow in FMS using Modified Petri Nets. Journal of Intelligent Manufacturing 10(6), 
557–568. 
 
Yu, H., Reyes, A., Cang, S., Lloyd S., 2003. Combined Petri net Modeling and AI Based Heuristic 
Hybrid Search for Flexible Manufacturing Systems—Part 1. Computers and Industrial 
Engineering 44(4), 527–543.  
 
Zhang, X., Lu, Q., Wu, T., 2011. Petri-net based application for supply chain management: an 
overview. International Journal of Production Research 49(13), 3939-3961.  
 
Zhou, S., Cox, I., Petricek, V., 2007, October. Characterising web site link structure. In Web Site 
Evolution, 2007. WSE 2007. 9th IEEE International Workshop on (pp. 73-80). IEEE. 
 32 
 
Zsidisin, G., Melnyk, S., Ragatz, G., 2005. An Institutional Theory Perspective of Business 
Continuity Planning for Purchasing and Supply Management. International Journal of Production 
Research 43(16), 3401–3420.  
 
Zurawski, R., Zhou, M., 1994. Petri Nets and Industrial Applications: A Tutorial. IEEE 
Transactions on Industrial Electronics 41(6),  567–583. 
 
 
 33 
 
Figure 1. Service Parts Supply Chain Example 
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Figure 2. Petri net Representation for the Service Parts Supply Chain Example 
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Node 
Type 
Node 
Designator 
Node 
Description 
Initial 
Marking 
Input 
Nodes 
Output 
Nodes 
Place m1 Supplier 1 (Plastics) 0 a1, a2, a7 a3 
Place m2 Supplier 2 (Painting/Plating) 0 a1, a4 a5 
Place m3 Supplier 3 (Final Assembler) 0 a5, a7 a6 
Place m4 Supplier 4 (Sub-Assembler) 0 a3 a4 
Place m5 Supplier 5 (Electronics) 0 a5 a2 
Place m6 Supplier 6 (Hardware) 1 – a7 
Place m7 Supplier 7 (Machine Shop) 1 – a1 
Place m8 Distribution Center (DC) 1 0 a4, a6, a9 a8 
Place m9 Distribution Center (DC) 2 0 a7, a12, a16, a17 a9 
Place m10 Distribution Center (DC) 3 0 a2, a6, a7, a8 a21 
Place m11 Manufacturing Facility (MF) 0 a10 a11 
Place m12 Dealer 1 0 a11 – 
Place m13 Dealer 2 0 a11 – 
Place m14 Dealer 3 0 a11 – 
Place m15 Dealer 4 0 a11 – 
Transition a1 Shipment from Supplier 7 0 m7 m1, m2, m10 
Transition a2 Shipment from Supplier 5 0 m5 m1, m9  
Transition a3 Shipment from Supplier 1 0 m1 m4 
Transition a4 Shipment from Supplier 4 0 m4 m2, m8 
Transition a5 Shipment from Supplier 2 0 m2 m3, m5 
Transition a6 Shipment from Supplier 3 0 m3 m8, m9 
Transition a7 Shipment from Supplier 6 0 m6 m1, m3, m9 
Transition a8 Shipment from DC 1 0 m8 m9, m10 
Transition a9 Shipment from DC 2 0 m9 m8, m10 
Transition a10 Shipment from DC 3 0 m10 m11 
Transition a11 
Shipment from 
Manufacturing Facility 0 m11 m12, m13, m14, m15 
 
Table 1. Place Nodes and Transition Nodes for the Service Parts Supply Chain Example 
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   m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 m8 m9 m10 m11 m12 m13 m14 m15 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 a10 a11  
 m1 +                                 1                  
 m2   +                                   1              
 m3     +                                   1            
 m4       +                             1                
 m5         +                       1                    
 m6           +                               1          
 m7             +                 1                      
 m8               +                             1        
 m9                 +                             1      
 m10                   +                             1    
 m11                     +                             1  
 m12                       +                              
 m13                         +                            
 m14                           +                          
 m15                             +                        
 a1 1 1               1           +                      
 a2 1               1               +                    
 a3       1                           +                  
 a4   1           1                     +                
 a5     1   1                             +              
 a6               1 1                       +            
 a7 1   1           1 1                       +          
 a8                 1 1                         +        
 a9               1   1                           +      
 a10                     1                           +    
 a11                       1 1 1 1                     +  
                             
 
Table 2. Node Dependency Matrix for the Service Parts Supply Chain Example 
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 Levels Cycles 
1 m6, m7 m1, m2, m4, m5, a2, a3, a4, a5 
2 a1, a7 m8, m9, a8, a9 
3 m1, m2, m4, m5, a2, a3, a4, a5 
(also Cycle 1) 
 
4 m3  
5 a6 
6 m8, m9, a8, a9 
(also Cycle 2)  
7 m10 
8 a10 
9 m11 
10 a11 
11 m12, m13, m14, m15 
 
Table 3. Levels and Cycles in the Petri net Representation for the Service Parts Supply Chain Example 
 
